Revocation of the right to work from home: Limits of management’s authority

An order requiring an employee who works half the time from home to report to the workplace in person from Monday through Thursday is legally invalid. The key point is that a stricter requirement to be present at the workplace cannot be justified simply by citing the withdrawal of a “work-from-home privilege,” but rather requires a sound, specifically articulated balancing of interests within the framework of reasonable discretion under Section 106 of the German Trade Regulation Act (GewO) —such a transparent exercise of discretion was lacking in the present case, as the Düsseldorf Labor Court pointed out in its judgment of February 11, 2026 (3 Ca 6587/25).

Facts of the case

The judgment of the Düsseldorf Labor Court (ArbG) is based on the following facts: The plaintiff has been employed by the defendant since 2014 as an “IT Department Head for SAP Basis”; his gross monthly salary is 7,271.10 euros. Until the summer of 2025, he worked at least 50% of his working hours from home, particularly on Mondays and Fridays. A policy published in February 2025 (“Remote Work (EA)”) provided, among other things, for a maximum of 50% remote work per month, no more than three days per week, a requirement for approval by the supervisor, and exclusions (including no exclusive use on Mondays and Fridays, and no remote work immediately before or after vacation). In the summer of 2025, after a critical assessment of the department (“dire situation,” project delays, leadership shortcomings), the department head ordered that the plaintiff must perform his duties on-site in the future (“EA is canceled for you”). Later, he was granted one work-from-home day (Friday); otherwise, the requirement to be present at the office Monday through Thursday remained in effect. The plaintiff, who had pre-existing health conditions (bronchial asthma, herniated disc), requested, among other things, the option to work from home due to rehabilitation and physical therapy appointments. He sought (1) an order requiring the defendant to allow him to work 50% of his working hours from home, (2) alternatively, the right to work from home on Mondays and Fridays during a rehabilitation program, and (3) a declaration that the directive requiring him to work at the workplace from Monday through Thursday is invalid.

Reasons for the decision

In the opinion of the Düsseldorf Labor Court, the defendant’s instruction requiring the plaintiff to perform his work at the workplace from Monday through Thursday is, in principle, covered by the employer’s right to issue instructions under Section 106 GewO; however, it does not withstand scrutiny under the standard of reasonable discretion and is therefore invalid. The plaintiff’s claim to a specific amount of work-from-home time is expressly denied; neither the employment contract nor the notice regarding “external work” establishes a general commitment or any other basis for such a claim; rather, these are merely non-binding framework conditions for the exercise of the employer’s right to issue instructions. The court dismisses the alternative claim for two fixed days of working from home in connection with a rehabilitation program as inadmissible because it lacks the specificity required under Section 253(2)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) regarding the start date, duration, and connection to the treatment appointments. With regard to the motion for a declaratory judgment, the chamber notes that the defendant was unable to provide a plausible explanation as to why requiring the plaintiff to be present at the workplace on four out of five workdays would be suitable for remedying the organizational and communicative shortcomings in the plaintiff’s area of responsibility that the defendant described. In particular, it remains unclear why these problems would be resolved by having the plaintiff work at the office rather than from home, even though key contacts (external IT service providers) continue to work remotely. The directive thus essentially amounts to the withdrawal of the remote work arrangement previously in place, without any discernible sound justification for the measure; it is therefore an abuse of discretion and invalid.

Practical guidance

The decision clearly demonstrates that the withdrawal of a previously granted or established option to “work from home”—as an exercise of managerial authority—is subject to strict scrutiny under the standard of reasonable discretion. A blanket order requiring on-site presence that amounts to a “withdrawal of privilege” is insufficient for this purpose. Rather, the employer must demonstrate, in a concrete and comprehensible manner, which business objective is being pursued by the change and why increased on-site presence—and not other measures—is specifically suitable for achieving that objective. Employers should therefore always base work-from-home policies and any changes thereto on a clearly documented exercise of discretion.