Legal Insights
3. August 2026
Dominik Löffelmann
Vertical distribution agreements have recently gained considerable importance under competition law. This becomes clear e.g. by the latest decision of the German Federal Cartel Office dated 8 July 2026, which imposed aggregate fines of 11.9 million euro on companies active in the tire wholesale sector (Case No. B10-21/24). Previously the Federal Cartel Office has imposed fines in the amount of approximately 35 million euro in four cases, while the European Commission has imposed fines totalling as much as 158 million euro in three cases. These cases show that competition authorities are focusing on a wide range of forms of resale price maintenance and price monitoring in vertical distribution. Companies should therefore have their distribution practices reviewed for compliance with competition law and conduct regular competition-law compliance training.
Vertical distribution agreements have significantly gained in competition law relevance, as recent decisions by the Federal Cartel Office and the European Commission demonstrate. Vertical agreements—i.e. agreements between companies operating at different levels of the value chain, such as manufacturers and wholesalers—are subject to the cartel prohibition under Section 1 of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) and Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Key issues include resale price maintenance, exclusive supply obligations, the allocation of sales territories and non-compete obligations. Under certain conditions, such agreements may qualify for an exemption; the assessment of eligibility is a matter of self-assessment by the undertakings concerned.
By decision dated 8 July 2026 (Case No. B10-21/24), the Federal Cartel Office imposed aggregate fines of 11.9 million euro on companies in the tire wholesale sector for the anticompetitive distribution of Maxxis and CST tires. Following pressure from two wholesalers, Maxxis entered into margin guarantee agreements around the turn of 2015/2016. These agreements guaranteed the wholesalers a fixed margin per tire, coupled with an understanding that the tires would be marketed “defensively”.
In addition, Maxxis established a system of “price moderation”: recommended retail prices were communicated to wholesale customers, sales prices were monitored and interventions took place whenever deviations occurred. From June 2018 onwards, this was carried out systematically by email, with deadlines for implementation. The proceedings were triggered following a leniency application.
Over the past two years, the Federal Cartel Office has issued three further fining decisions concerning vertical agreements, imposing total fines of approximately 23 million euro: approximately 6 million euro in the distribution of premium headphones (Case No. B10-23/23), approximately 16 million euro in the distribution of AVM/Fritz! products (Case No. B10-21/23), and just under 800,000 euro in the distribution of protective clothing (Case No. B10-21/21).
A common feature of all these cases was that, in addition to purchase prices, the manufacturers coordinated end-consumer prices with their dealers and operated systematic price-monitoring systems. In some cases, the parties used covert methods: one manufacturer disguised resale price maintenance measures through an internal “code language”; another used the code word “content” for the end-consumer price and operated an own chat group for coordinating prices.
The cartels were uncovered in different ways: conducted in connection with a mutual assistance request from the Austrian competition authority, a submission via the Federal Cartel Office’s anonymous whistleblower system (BKMS), and a leniency application.
The European Commission, which is responsible for cross-border cases, has recently issued three fining decisions concerning vertical agreements: approximately 120 million euro against Gucci (Case No. AT.40840), approximately 20 million euro against Chloé (Case No. AT.40880), and approximately 18 million euro against LOEWE (Case No. AT.40881). The total fines therefore amounted to 158 million euro. The companies pursued a resale price maintenance (RPM) strategy: recommended retail prices were treated in practice as fixed prices, maximum discount levels were prescribed and professional price-monitoring systems were used. In one case, communication was deliberately limited to telephone calls and WhatsApp messages in order to conceal the anticompetitive conduct.
These cases illustrate that price fixing, price monitoring, and the granting of margin and discount incentives in vertical distribution remain a key focus for competition authorities. The exemption possibilities under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) apply only where market shares on both sides of the market do not exceed 30% each. The complex rule/exception framework of the VBER requires an in-depth legal assessment on a case-by-case basis. Distribution operations therefore face a tension between the desire to sell products at a particular price level and the need to comply with competition law. In particular, the following points should be noted:
Not only manufacturers may be fined; dealers may also be held liable, particularly where they benefited from the system.
Companies should therefore have their distribution practices reviewed for compliance with competition law, conduct regular compliance training and seek specialized legal advice without delay in cases of suspected infringement.
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